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The Convention on Contracts for the International
Sale of Goods' and the Uniform Commercial Code2
Remedies in Light of Remedial Principles Recognized
under U.S. Law: Are the Remedies of Granting
Additional Time to the Defaulting Parties and of
Reduction of Price Fair and Efficient Ones?
Catherine Pich *
Introduction
The area of remedies is, and will remain, an area of key
interest to parties to international sales contracts. American
businessmen entering into such contracts with foreign parties, and
the attorneys counseling them, must know the appropriate legal
systems and the corresponding obligations, liabilities, and
remedies that may be alleged in case of breach. This article will
examine remedies provisions found under the Convention on
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG) and under
the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC).3 In particular, the article
will address two remedies under the CISG that are still not fully
understood by scholars: the granting of additional time and price
reduction. Furthermore, this article will determine whether these
two remedies lead to fair and efficient results. Finally, the article
will examine how those remedies depart from traditional remedial
concepts and how they establish new remedial principles of
I UNITED NATIONS, CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF
GOODS, U.N. Doc. A/CN.97/18 (1980) [hereinafter CISG].
2 U.C.C. (2002).
Catherine Pichd (LL.L., magna cum laude, University of Ottowa; LL.B.,
University of Dalhousie; LL.M. (in International Commercial Law), New York
University) is currently an attorney in commercial litigation at the New York law firm of
Weil, Gotshal & Manges, LLP, and will soon join the Montreal law firm of Ogilvy
Renault, as an attorney in their litigation department. She is grateful to Professor Clayton
P. Gillette, at New York University School of Law, for his precious help in writing this
article. All errors remain the author's alone.
3 This analysis will emphasize remedies available to the buyer, since the buyer is
the one who receives the goods.
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substantial potential significance in certain scenarios.
Part I deals with the breach of contract and compares the
"perfect tender rule" under the UCC and the "fundamental breach"
and "avoidance" principles under the CISG. It further evaluates
the two schemes in light of creating efficient and fair results.4 Part
II discusses the complex remedy of granting additional time for
performance to a defaulting party (or "Nachfrist") under the
CISG.5 It examines the CISG's primary purpose and functions,
the conditions for fixing the Nachfrist period, the binding effect of
that period on the parties, and the efficiency and fairness aspects
of Nachfrist. Part III discusses another complex remedy, the
reduction of price under Article 50 CISG.6 It examines Article
50's origin, uses, conditions, and calculation. Furthermore, the
Article 50 remedy is contrasted with an award of damages and
with the provisions of the UCC. Finally, some justifications to the
reduction of price are suggested. This article will answer the
following questions: Do the two schemes of the UCC and the
CISG comply with the two main objectives of commercial law,
fairness and efficiency? More specifically, do reduction of price
and Nachfrist fill the same objectives, and if not, are they
justifiable otherwise?
I. Breach of Contract for the Sale of Goods
The rules concerning rejection of goods and cancellation for
breach of contract are very different under the schemes of the
CISG and the UCC. These differences can cause varying results
on the economic level. Although it cannot be said that there exists
a true underlying policy of minimization of costs, both the UCC
and the CISG induce commercial parties to minimize their risks
and losses.7 The most important difference between U.S. domestic
sales law and international sales law is the elimination of the
"perfect tender" rule.8
4 See infra notes 7-126 and accompanying text.
5 See infra notes 127-183 and accompanying text.
6 See infra notes 184-173 and accompanying text.
7 CLAYTON P. GILLETTE & STEVEN D. WALT, SALES LAW: DOMESTIC AND
INTERNATIONAL 167 (1st ed. 1999).
8 See generally Henry D. Gabriel, A Primer on the United Nations Convention on
the International Sale of Goods: From the Perspective of the Uniform Commercial Code,
7 IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 279 (1997).
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A. Concept of "Perfect Tender" Under the UCC
The perfect tender rule permits the buyer to reject a tender of
delivery under a one-delivery contract of sale that fails in any
respect to conform to the contract.9 In fact, both the goods and
their tender must conform to the contract."l The rule excludes the
extent of the nonconformity as a condition for rejection. Thus, if
the tender is not "perfect," the buyer may reject it for any reason at
all, or may accept the defective tender and sue for breach of
warranty. l The perfect tender rule gives the buyer three options
in case of a defective tender: first, the goods may be rejected as a
whole; second, they may be accepted as a whole; and third, any
commercial unit or units may be accepted and the rest rejected. 2
A buyer is deemed to have accepted the goods if he or she fails
to make an effective rejection under Section 2-601(l)(b) UCC. 13
There are arguably two components to a rejection: a procedural
part and a substantive part.'4 The procedural part of a rejection
refers to Section 2-602 UCC, which requires the buyer to reject
within a reasonable time after delivery or tender and to seasonably
notify the seller.' 5 Section 2-605 UCC requires the buyer to advise
9 U.C.C. § 2-601 (2002). The perfect tender rule "is in general intended to
continue the policy of requiring exact performance by the seller of his obligations as a
condition to his right to require acceptance." Id. § 2-601 cmt. 2.
10 See NORDSTROM, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF SALES 311 (1970).
11 See id.
12 U.C.C. § 2-601 (2002). The UCC establishes a different standard for the perfect
tender rule for installment contracts, under Section 2-612, and for revocation of
acceptance, under Section 2-608. See id. §§ 2-608, 2-612. In the case of installment
contracts, the perfect tender rule is still valid in case of a failure to perform completely,
but something short of a perfect tender will obligate the installment contract buyer to
accept and pay the price of the goods under Section 2-612. Id. § 2-612. The perfect
tender rule is also inapplicable if a buyer revokes acceptance under Section 2-608, where
a tender's nonconformity "substantially impairs its value to him." Id. § 2-608.
Situations in which the parties have agreed to limit their remedies are also exempted
from the ambit of the rule and from the requirement that the tender be "perfect." Indeed,
the parties may agree to limit their remedies in case of default, for example by drafting a
liquidated damages clause, or by including an agreement that provides for remedies in
addition to or in substitution for those of Section 2. Id.
13 Id. § 2-601(1)(d).
14 ALAN SCHWARTZ & ROBERT E. SCOTT, SALES LAW AND THE CONTRACTING
PROCESS 245 (2d ed. 1991).
15 See U.C.C. § 2-602 (2002).
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the seller in the notification of rejection of any defect that is
ascertainable by reasonable inspection, if the seller would be able
to cure the defect if given reasonable notice. 6 Failure to do so
will preclude the buyer from relying on the unstated defect to
justify rejection of the goods or to establish breach. 7 This section
reflects a policy that it is often more cost-minimizing to salvage
the transaction than to avoid it.' 8 The substantive part or aspect of
rejection is that it can be completely unjustified. Indeed, the buyer
has the absolute right to reject even if the seller believes that the
goods are conforming, provided that the rejection is effective. 9 If
a court cannot determine whether the rejection was in conformity
with the procedural requirement, it must look at which party
would be the best reseller and have him or her bear the transaction
costs.2" Of course, this is in view of minimizing costs associated
with a failed transaction.2' More often than not, the best reseller
will be the seller, who has the expertise, the market, and the
available resources.22
If the time for performance has not expired and the buyer
rejects a tender of goods for nonconformity, the seller retains an
unconditional right to cure by making a conforming delivery
within the time allowed under the contract. 23  After the seller
16 Id. § 2-605.
17 Id. There is a similar penalty if the buyer fails to specify objections to the tender
in a transaction "between merchants when the seller has after rejection made a request in
writing for a full and final written* statement of all defects on which the buyer proposes to
rely." See id.
18 See id. § 2-605 cmt. 2 ("[T]he general policy of this Article... [is to preserve]
the deal wherever possible ... .
19 See id. § 2-602.
20 GILLETTE & WALT, supra note 7, at 197.
21 See id. Indeed, courts must afford default rules that maximize the surplus to the
parties. They must interpret contracts in a way that they believe would be socially
desirable; they must allocate obligations efficiently and to do so, they must look at who
could bear the risk at the least cost, i.e., who is the most efficient risk-bearer. Id.
22 See George L. Priest, Breach and Remedy for the Tender of Nonconforming
Goods Under the Uniform Commercial Code: An Economic Approach, 91 HARV. L.
REv. 960, 965 (1978).
23 U.C.C. § 2-508(1) (2002). This first situation may be one based on fairness to
the seller without causing harm to the buyer, assuming that the buyer rejected the tender
because it was truly nonconforming and not because the buyer wanted to behave
opportunistically. It should be noted that parties to a contract may agree that the seller is
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cures, the buyer may recover damages.24 In fact, the seller can
even cure the nonconforming tender after the time for performance
has passed if the seller had reasonable grounds to believe that the
tender would be accepted "with or without money allowance," and
if the seller "seasonably notifies the buyer" of the seller's intention
to cure and cures the non-conforming tender "within a further
reasonable time., 25 This subsection permits the seller to force the
buyer in good faith to accept cure when the agreed delay for
performance has expired.26
Cure is allowed in view of avoiding bad faith rejections, where
the circumstances and the buyer's valuation of the goods have
changed between the time of signature and the time of
performance of the contract.27 There are three kinds of cure: (1)
not to be allowed to cure the non-conforming tender. These agreements are usually
upheld by courts because of Section 1-102(3) and (4) UCC. See id §§ 1-102(3), (4).
Parties may also agree to expand the seller's right to cure a defective tender with, for
example, a repair and replacement clause. At last, if the parties want to give the buyer a
right to ask for cure of a defective tender, they may do so, still under the provision for
freedom of contract under the UCC.
24 SCHWARTZ & SCOTT, supra note 14, at 273.
25 U.C.C. § 2-508(2) (2002).
26 T. W. Oil Inc. v. Cons. Edison Co., 57 N.Y.2d 574 (N.Y. 1982). In this case, the
plaintiff had purchased a cargo of fuel oil. Id. at 577. The sulfur content of the oil was
supposed to be no greater than 1%. Id. The oil ended up at its arrival to be at 0.52%. Id.
The plaintiff sold that oil to the defendant, agreeing that the sulfur content was to be
0.5%, consistent with trade practice. Id. The defendant ended up receiving oil that bore
a sulfur content of 0.92%. Id. at 578. The defendant rejected the tender and refused to
accept the oil at an adjusted price. Id. Instead, the defendant insisted on paying no more
than the latest prevailing price for the oil, and further, rejected an offer to cure the defect
with a subsequent shipment of conforming oil, adamant to prevail itself of the
intervening drop in prices. Id. The court found the function of cure to be to prevent
undue surprise to a seller as a result of some technical nonconformity claimed by the
buyer. Id. at 586. It subjected the right to refuse cure to a good faith test, explaining that
this is to prevent chiseling by buyers who reject goods following market price
fluctuations. Id. The court stated:
[A] seller should have recourse to a relief afforded by the Uniform Commercial
Code, § 2-508 as long as it can establish that it had reasonable grounds, tested
objectively, for its belief that the goods would be accepted. The test for
reasonableness, in this context, must encompass the concepts of "good faith"
and "commercial standards of fair dealing," which permeate the Code.
Id.
27 See id.
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by repair, (2) by money, and (3) by replacement.28 Cure may be
objectionable, since it has bad incentive effects; the seller may
devote insufficient attention to getting the perfect tender due to the
second chance at performance.29 In particular, cure by repair is
objectionable since it can reduce the value of the goods when the
defect relates to product reliability. 3° Cure by repair might thus
not be a "perfect" and fair tender without the price reduction.
However, the inability to cure generally may also have bad
incentive effects, allowing parties to act strategically by rejecting
tenders in bad faith. The issue thus becomes, which situation is
more likely? As this article demonstrates, the analysis of the
various possibilities of strategic behavior is, in fact, a complex
one.
Subsection 2-508(2) UCC is difficult to interpret and justify.
It reads as follows: "Where the buyer rejects a non-conforming
tender which the seller had reasonable grounds to believe would be
acceptable with or without money allowance the seller may if he
seasonably notifies the buyer have a further reasonable time to
substitute a conforming tender."3' As Nordstrom explains, there
are two plausible readings: "Which [tender] the seller had
reasonable grounds to believe would be acceptable," or "which
[non-conforming tender] the seller had reasonable grounds to
believe would be acceptable. 3 2 He believes that the first reading
28 See SCHWARTZ & SCOTT, supra note 14, at 288.
29 Id. at 282.
30 Id. An example of a case where the court referred to the fact that the seller might
have a second chance at performance is Wilson v. Scampoli, 228 A.2d 848 (D.C. 1967),
where a customer had bought a color television set that later revealed itself to have an
excessive red tinge to the picture. The customer asserted that she did not want the
television "repaired," but wanted a "brand new" television set. Id. The issue was thus
whether the dealer had to conform his tender by adjustment or minor repair or whether
he must conform by substituting brand new merchandise. Id. at 849. Judge Myers held
that:
We do not hold that appellant has no liability to appellee, but as he was denied
access and a reasonable opportunity to repair, appellee has not shown a breach
of warranty entitling him either to a brand new set or to rescission. We therefore
reverse the judgment of the trial court granting rescission and directing the
return of the purchase price of the set.
Id. at 850.
31 U.C.C. § 2-508(2) (2002).
32 NORDSTROM, supra note 10, at 319.
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should be rejected. 33 Section 2-508(2) should thus be restricted to
cases where a seller knew that his tender was non-conforming and
reasonably thought that the buyer would still accept the non-
conforming tender, but the seller was surprised by the rejection.
Actually, the latter provision is intended to be a safeguard
against surprise that occurs as a result of the perfect tender rule.34
Some commentators have suggested that there is an important flaw
found in the application of Section 2-508(2), explaining that cases
to which that subsection purports to apply-where the seller is
surprised at the rejection of a nonconforming tender--do not seem
to exist.35 Indeed, Schwartz and Scott explain that this subsection
is contradictory because it supposes that a seller could be surprised
by rejection of the non-conforming tender, but in fact, "[i]n any
case where the seller is reasonably 'surprised' by rejection, the
rejection will be wrongful because the goods will, in fact, conform
to the contract."36 This view neglects that the seller could, in fact,
not have realized that the tender was nonconforming; the seller
could very well have made all efforts to produce a complying
tender, but without success. Moreover, it should not be forgotten
that Section 2-508(2) requires the seller to have had "reasonable
grounds to believe" that the tender would be acceptable.37 The
latter requirement limits the extent of bad faith on the part of the
seller and broadens the number of cases where the subsection may
apply. Other authors have said that they believe Section 2-508(2)
to be useful, explaining that cure by the seller avoids economic
waste of an unlimited right to reject for any technical
nonconformity, and that it prevents bad faith rejections.38
33 Id. at 321.
34 U.C.C. §§ 2-106(2) cmt. 2, 2-508 (2002).
35 SCHWARTZ & SCOTT, supra note 14, at 275.
36 Id. at 274. Indeed, according to the authors, where a seller is surprised by the
rejection of one hundred cases of perfectly fresh tomatoes, the buyer probably rejected
for a bad reason, that is, one other than an alleged nonconformity of the tomatoes to the
original bargain. Id. It must be emphasized, again, that it does not matter whether the
rejection is wrongful, so long as it is made in an effective manner. See supra note 12 and
accompanying text.
37 U.C.C. § 2-508(2) (2002). And in fact, Comment 2 to Section 2-508 states that
"[s]uch reasonable grounds can lie in prior course of dealing, course of performance or
usage of trade as well as in the particular circumstances surrounding the making of the
contract." Id. § 2-508 cmt. 2.
38 SCHWARTZ & SCOTT, supra note 14, at 276. Schwartz and Scott also criticize the
2003]
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Once the goods are accepted, the buyer may only force the
seller to take them back if he or she revokes acceptance, in cases
where the nonconformity substantially impairs the value of the
goods to the buyer.39 At that point, the fact that the tender was not
"perfect" becomes irrelevant in determining whether the buyer
must accept and pay for the goods. Any nonconformity will be
compensated in damages, which can be deducted from the price if
it is still due under the same contract.4" This requirement of
substantiality in the defect or nonconformity of the tender is
similar to the CISG instance of "fundamental breach,"41 where the
nonconformity causing injury is found to be "substantial." But
more precisely, how do the CISG provisions differ from those of
the UCC?
B. The Concepts of "Fundamental Breach " and
"Avoidance" Under the CISG
Avoidance under the CISG is the process through which an
aggrieved party, by notice to the other side, terminates the
contractual obligations of the parties.42 In fact, it relieves both
parties of executory performance obligations.43 The buyer can
"avoid" the contract in two instances: (1) if the seller's failure to
perform any obligation amounts to a "fundamental breach,, 44 or
(2) if, in the case of non-delivery of goods, the seller does not
"economic waste" argument, saying that it is unlikely that a seller will be forced to take
back the tender upon rejection, since the buyer will often opt for a price reduction and
keep the goods. Id.
39 U.C.C. § 2-608(1) (2002). See SCHWARTZ & SCOTT, supra note 14, at 309, for
an essay on the substantial impairment requirement.
40 U.C.C. § 2-717 (2002). It must be noted that this remedy is distinguishable from
the remedy of reduction of price under Article 50 CISG. See infra Section III.D.2 and
accompanying text.
41 CISG, supra note 1, art. 46.
42 See id. art. 49. If the goods received are non-conforming and the buyer wants to
make an effective avoidance of the contract, a notice must be given to the seller, as
provided under Article 26 CISG. Id. art. 26. Power to avoid for quality or quantity
defects expires at a reasonable time after the buyer knew or ought to have known of the
breach, id art. 49(2)(b)(i), and power to avoid for late delivery that constitutes
fundamental breach expires at a reasonable time after the buyer has become aware that
delivery has been made. Id. art. 49(2)(a).
43 Id. art. 81(1).
44 Id. art. 49(l)(a).
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deliver them within the additional period of time fixed by the
buyer, the Nachfrist notice.45 The seller may also "avoid" the
contract in a similar manner, when there is fundamental breach, or
when the buyer fails to pay or take delivery of the goods during
the Nachfrist period.46
In fact, "avoidance" under the CISG and "rejection" under the
UCC are two different principles, which create different remedies
where a buyer has received and retained the goods.47 Indeed, the
aggrieved seller's right under the CISG to avoid the contract
where the buyer has possession of the goods has no Section 2
parallel.48 Under the UCC, the seller's normal remedy if the buyer
accepts the goods is an action for the price under Section 2-709. 49
In contrast, under the CISG the seller may avoid the contract,"
claim restitution of the goods accepted,5' recover resale,52 or obtain
market-price damages. 3 Where the seller is in breach, the buyer's
option to avoid even though the buyer has received the goods
yields results similar to those under Section 2 UCC. In cases other
than those where the buyer has accepted the goods and has
breached the contract, avoidance triggers the avoiding party's right
to resale/cover or to market price damages,54 which are specific
remedies similar to those under Section 2 UCC 5
If the contract is not avoided, the CISG provides that the
45 Id. art. 49(I)(b); see FRITZ ENDERLIEN & DIETRICH MASKOW, INTERNATIONAL
SALES LAW 192-93 (1992). We will study the Nachfrist notice in Section II, infra.
46 CISG, supra note 1, art. 63, 64.
47 See Harry M. Flechtner, Remedies Under the New International Sales
Convention: The Perspective From Article 2 of the UCC, 8 J.L. & CoM. 53 (1988).
48 Id.
49 See U.C.C. § 2-709 (2002).
50 CISG, supra note 1, art. 64.
51 Id. art. 81(2).
52 Id. art. 75.
53 Id. art. 76
54 Id. art. 75, 76.
55 See U.C.C. § 2-711(1) (2002). Where the seller is the aggrieved party, the seller
is relieved of performance under the contract. CISG, supra note 1, art. 81(1). The seller
can claim restitution from the buyer, id art. 81 (2)(4), as well as market-price differential
or resale damages. Id. art. 75. A Section 2 UCC seller has similar rights and obligations,
since he can "cancel," U.C.C. § 2-703 (f) (2002), and recover resale or market-price
differential damages. Id. §§ 2-703(e), 2-708(1).
2003]
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exchange of goods and services will be completed despite a
breach, with damages or other remedies to compensate for defects
in the exchange.56 If the buyer has possession of the goods, non-
avoidance produces a result similar to those under Section 2 UCC
where the buyer has accepted and not revoked; the seller has a
right to the price and the buyer can claim damages for losses
caused by the breach.57 Further, the non-avoiding buyer has
certain remedies not available under Section 2 UCC, such as the
right to demand substitute goods in case of fundamental breach58
and the right to demand repair unless that would be "unreasonable
in the circumstances."5 9 Last, he or she can resort to the reduction
of price remedy under Article 50 CISG.6 °
Under the CISG, a buyer can "avoid" the contract if
nonconformity substantially deprives the buyer of what the buyer
was entitled to expect under the contract only if the seller foresaw,
or a party in his position would have foreseen, such a result.
61
56 In general, remedies available to the buyer where the seller fails to perform his
duties under Articles 30-44 CISG are provided for under Articles 45-52 CISG. See
CISG, supra note 1, art. 30-44, 45-52. Comparable remedies to the seller for breach by
the buyer are found under Articles 60-65 CISG (and obligations of the buyer are found
under Articles 53-65 CISG). See id. art. 53-65. Both sections are supplemented by
remedial provisions in Articles 71-88 CISG that apply to both parties (e.g., anticipatory
breach, measurement of damages and interests, exemption from damages, and effects of
avoidance of the contract). See id. art. 71-88.
57 Id. art. 62; U.C.C. § 2-709(1)(a) (2002). Under the CISG, the aggrieved party
that chooses not to avoid the contract may recover damages "equal to the loss, including
loss of profit, suffered by the other party as a consequence of the breach," provided that
that loss was foreseeable. CISG, supra note 1, art. 74. Under the UCC, similarly, the
aggrieved party may recover damages under Sections 2-709(1) and 2-714, in case of
acceptance. U.C.C. §§ 2-709(1), 2-714 (2002).
58 CISG, supra note 1, art. 46(2).
59 Id. art. 46(3). Under the Section 2-508 UCC, an aggrieved buyer could only
obtain substitute goods or repair if the seller volunteers to that effect. U.C.C. § 2-508
(2002).
60 CISG, supra note 1, art. 50.
61 See id. art. 25 (emphasis added). For an example of a case where the court held
that there had been a fundamental breach, see Magellan Int'l Corp. v. Salzgitter Handel
GmbH, 76 F. Supp. 2d 919 (N.D. Ill. 1999). The court explained:
[Article 25's] plain language reveals that under the Convention an anticipatory
repudiation pleader need simply allege (1) that the defendant intended to breach
the contract before the contract's performance date and (2) that such breach was
fundamental. Here [buyer] has pleaded that [seller]'s March 29 letter indicated
its pre-performance intention not to perform the contract, coupled with
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This follows from Article 49(1) CISG, which permits a buyer to
avoid the contract only if the seller's failure to perform amounts to
a "fundamental breach," as defined under Article 25 CISG.62 As
author Peter Schlechtriem explains, there is a "fundamental"
breach of contract, which justifies avoidance or a demand for
substitute goods, "if the injured party has no further interest in the
performance of the contract after the particular breach."63  For
example, a violation of the time for performance can constitute a
fundamental breach of contract when the other party cannot use
the late delivery for the purpose envisaged in the contract.64
"Fundamentality" will not be deduced from the facts of the case,
but rather, the facts will be "interpreted according to the legal
consequence which is intuitively felt to be the just one."65
More specifically, the definition of "fundamental breach" has
two components: the first is the detriment/expectation component
and the second is the foreseeability component.66 Although the
detriment/expectation component is what makes a breach
"fundamental," liability for such a breach is limited by the
affirmative defense of foreseeability. 67 The decisive criterion is
thus whether the injury is sufficiently "substantial," as is
[buyer's] allegation that the bill of lading requirement was an essential part of
the parties' bargain. That being the case, [seller's] insistence upon an
amendment of that requirement would indeed be a fundamental breach.
Id. at 925-26; see also Clemens Pauly, The Concept of Fundamental Breach as an
International Principle to Create Uniformity of Commercial Law, 19 J.L. & COM. 221
(2000).
62 CISG, supra note 1, art. 25. Article 25 of the CISG defines "fundamental
breach" as a breach that "results in such detriment to the other party as substantially to
deprive him of what he is entitled to expect under the contract, unless the party in breach
did not foresee and a reasonable person of the same kind in the same circumstances
would not have foreseen such a result." Id.
63 PETER SCHLECHTRIEM, UNIFORM SALES LAW: THE U.N. CONVENTION FOR THE
INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS 22 (1986), available at CISG W3 Database, Pace
University School of Law.
64 ENDERLEIN & MASKOW, supra note 45, at 113.
65 Id. at 111.
66 Andrew Babiak, Defining "Fundamental Breach" under the United Nations
Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, 6 TEMPLE INT'L & COMP.
L.J. 113, 118 (1992).
67 See CISG, supra note 1, art. 25. Indeed, the party in breach may prove that she
did not see and had no reason to foresee a particular result. This is both an objective and
a subjective criterion. See Babiak, supra, note 66, at 119-20.
20031
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determined in light of the circumstances of each case. Factors that
are taken into consideration to determine whether the injury is
substantial are "the monetary value of the contract, the monetary
harm caused by the breach, or the extent to which the breach
interferes with other activities of the injured party."68  The
"importance of the interest which the contract and its individual
obligations actually create for the promisee" is what should truly
be assessed.69 As for the foreseeability component, the question is
whether the breaching party foresaw the substantial detriment or
loss of expectation interest it caused to the non-breaching party,
and whether a reasonable person of the same kind and in the same
circumstances would foresee that the breach of contract would
cause the non-breaching party substantial detriment. The lack of
foreseeability and knowledge is a subjective ground for excusing
the party in breach,7" measured as of the time of contract
formation.7  In fact, it serves to "eliminate unreasonable
persons."72
As under the UCC provisions, if the seller delivers
nonconforming goods, he or she may cure the defect, "provided
that the exercise of this right does not cause the buyer
unreasonable inconvenience or unreasonable expense."73  If the
seller fails to cure the defect, the buyer may then do one of two
things. First, he or she may exercise rights found in Articles 46
through 52 of the CISG through court orders, such as claiming
performance or a "second tendering," avoidance of the contract, or
68 UNITRAL SECRETARIAT, COMMENTARY ON THE 1978 DRAFT CONVENTION ON
CONTRACTS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS, UN Doc. A/Conf. 97/5 (1979),
available at CISG W3 Database, Pace University School of Law [hereinafter
COMMENTARY ON DRAFT]; see also John C. Duncan, Nachfrist Was 1st? Thinking
Globally and Acting Locally: Considering Time Extension Principles of the U.N.
Convention on Contracts For the International Sale of Goods in Revising the Uniform
Commercial Code, 2000 B.Y.U L. REV. 1363; Babiak, supra note 66, at 119-120.
69 PETER SCHLECHTRIEM, COMMENTARY ON THE U.N. CONVENTION ON THE
INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS 177 (2d ed. 1998). See also Celia R. Taylor, Self-Help
in Contract Law: An Exploration and Proposal, 33 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 839, 904
(1998).
70 SCHLECHTRIEM, supra note 69, at 178.
71 Id. at 180; Flechtner, supra note 47, at 7.
72 Taylor, supra note 69, at 24.
73 CISG, supra note 1, art. 37.
[Vol. 28
CONTRACT REMEDIES FOR THE SALE OF GOODS
reduction of the price.74 Substitute goods may be ordered only if
the deficiency in the original delivery was a fundamental breach,75
and an order to repair is permitted unless repair is unreasonable in
the circumstances.76 Second, the buyer may claim damages, as
provided under Articles 74 though 77.77 Finally and very
importantly, Article 39 of the CISG requires the buyer to notify
the seller about any nonconformity that the buyer has discovered
or should have discovered upon a proper examination of the goods
if the buyer expects it to be repaired or replaced.78
In sum, the CISG adopts an attitude in favor of keeping a
contract for an international sale intact, i.e., the principle of
preservation of the contract. 79 The philosophy of the CISG is that
the high expenses usually associated with an international sale
should deter a severe reaction, such as avoidance as a result of an
obligor's non-performance.8" Also, avoidance should not be
available for trivial departures that would readily be redressed by
damages.81 This attitude is illustrated throughout the CISG by a
74 Id. art. 46-52.
75 Id. art. 46(2).
76 Id. art. 46(3).
77 Id. art. 74-77.
78 Id. art. 39. The notice must allow the seller to take the necessary steps to remedy
the defect and should be specific as to "the nature of the lack of nonconformity." Id. If
that notice is not given, the buyer loses the right to rely on the lack of conformity of the
goods. Id.
79 Phanesh Koneru, The International Interpretation of the UN Convention on
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods: An Approach Based on General
Principles, 6 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 105, 121 (1997). This principle of preservation
has been called "[tihe ultimate unifying general principle of the Convention." Id.; see
also ENDERLEIN & MASKOW, supra note 45, at 87 ("The fact that the fundamentality of a
breach of contract in many cases is the condition for an avoidance of contract is the
expression of the trend of the CISG to preserve contracts, which we consider as essential
in international trade.") (emphasis added); Evelien Visser, Gaps in the CISG: In General
and With Specific Emphasis on the Interpretation of the Remedial Provisions of the
Convention in Light of the General Principles of the CISG (1998) (unpublished LLM
thesis, University of Georgia School of Law) (on file with the North Carolina Journal of
International Law and Commercial Regulation), available at CISG W3 database, Pace
University School of Law, January 24, 2003; Bernard Audit, The Vienna Sales
Convention and the Lex Mercatoria, in LEX MERCATORIA AND ARBITRATION, 173, 190
(Carbonneau ed., rev. ed. 1998).
80 Koneru, supra note 79, at 116-21.
81 CISG, supra note 1, art. 74; JoHN 0. HONNOLD, UNIFORM LAW FOR
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strong emphasis on cure, the adoption of the Nachfrist procedure,
and the limitations placed on an aggrieved party's power to cancel
the contract.8 2 In fact, the policy is in part founded on the civil law
approach to specific performance and in part on "the nature of
international contracts, where the need for judicial intervention is
negated., 8
3
Some authors have remarked that if the perfect tender rule
were to be applied in the international sales context, there would
be great consequences and excessive waste.84 These authors are
arguably mistaken, as the application of the perfect tender rule to
certain product environments in the international sales context
might very well be a more adequate approach. For instance, in the
fungible, easily replaceable commodities market, there is good
sense in applying a "perfect tender" rule, while in the market for
complex, specially-designed machinery, making avoidance
difficult should be the preferred approach. Furthermore, these
authors seem to forget that the perfect tender rule comes with an
unconditional right to cure a defective tender,85 which may in fact
impose much higher costs and burdens on the parties. This, in
practice, creates a legal scheme similar to that of "fundamental
breach" under the CISG.86 Indeed, even in a case where a buyer
decides to opt out of the contract for a trivial default in the tender,
the cure provision automatically gives the seller a right to submit a
new complying tender, which the buyer will have to accept. It
can, therefore, be argued that the perfect tender rule under the
UCC, doubled with its comprehensive cure provisions, amounts to
a "substantial performance" requirement equivalent to the CISG
"fundamental breach" rule.
C. Evaluation of the Two Concepts In Terms of Creating
Efficient and Fair Rules and Results
The two schemes for performance under the CISG and the
UCC must be analyzed in light of two important norms in the
INTERNATIONAL SALES 327 (3d ed. 1999).
82 See Duncan, supra note 68, at n.88.
83 Id.
84 Id. at 1378.
85 Id. at 1377-79.
86 See discussion infra Section C.
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contract doctrine: efficiency and fairness. Efficiency is concerned
with enforcement of contracts for the purpose of an efficient use of
resources or for the maximization of wealth.87 The theory of
"efficient breach" requires that each party breach the contract if
the benefits in breaching outweigh the costs of preserving the
bargain.88 As for the larger concept of "efficiency," it requires a
maximization of the sum of the payoffs to the promisor and to the
promisee; that is, both must enter into mutually beneficial
transactions at minimal cost and each must receive a net benefit.89
Fairness is a norm of equity, and is much harder to define. The
notion of a fair exchange seems to attract feelings of compassion
and morality from judges having to interpret contracts and requires
that a fair allocation of losses be present between parties to a
contract. In fact, the fairness inquiry allows judges to venture
outside the realm of contract law and search for "true justice. 9 °
Of course, the latter concept of "true justice" should not permit
judges to venture too far from the realm of contract law, as that
may paradoxically create unfair results.
Legal rules establishing rights and remedies for contracting
parties affect the costs of reaching a contract. 91 The rules are
usually efficient and cost-minimizing, since they anticipate the
allocation of rights and risks for which the parties would have
bargained.92 The rules will also resolve disputes in the same way
parties would have resolved them had they explicitly been
provided for in the contract, so that costs of outside litigation are
avoided.93 Otherwise, parties will choose to opt out of the legal
scheme. Thus, the CISG and the UCC both induce commercial
actors to minimize the risk of defective performance and the losses
that result in such a case. 94 The cure provisions are but one
87 Larry A. DiMatteo, The Norms of Contract: The Fairness Inquiry and the "Law
of Satisfaction ": A Nonunified Theory, 24 HOFSTRA L. REv. 349, 441 (1995).
88 Id.
89 Id.
90 Id. at 380-81.
91 Priest, supra note 22, at 961; see also Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps
in Incomplete Contracts, in RICHARD CRASWELL & ALAN SCHWARTZ, FOUNDATIONS OF
CONTRACT LAW 22 (1994).
92 Priest, supra note 22, at 961-62.
93 Id. at 962.
94 GILLETTE & WALT, supra note 7, at 167.
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example of this trend within the two systems. 95 But are the UCC
and CISG schemes truly efficient?
The UCC perfect tender rule's test for performance may at the
outset appear to create a much more lenient system, where a slight
nonconformity allows the buyer to escape the contract by rejecting
the nonconforming goods or tender. 96 Some may think that it
provides for an important privilege of rejection for trivialities.
However, the provisions on cure under the UCC greatly limit this
possibility.97 Indeed, as explained above, the seller will always
have an absolute right to cure a defective tender made before the
time for performance has expired.98 Even after the expiry of the
time for delivery, the seller may have an additional reasonable
time to substitute a conforming tender, if he had "reasonable
grounds to believe" that the nonconforming tender would be
accepted.99
The structure of the CISG remedial scheme places more
emphasis on performance remedies, than the damages as in
common law systems.1"' The CISG drafters are said to have
wanted to preserve the sanctity of international contracts, 10 1
thinking that the high expenses usually associated with such
contracts should deter a severe reaction such as rescission in
reaction to non-performance. 1°2 In fact, one could argue that the
uncertainty associated with the definition of "fundamental breach"
95 In fact, cure is an efficient default rule as it allows parties to solve the problem
by themselves and saves transaction costs, while also putting the burden on the one who
can solve it more cheaply. For example, a car salesman could repair a car at the cheapest
cost. This idea is conducive to the goal of greater social welfare.
96 See U.C.C. § 2-508 (2002).
97 See id.
98 See id. § 2-508(1).
99 Id. § 2-508(2).
100 Visser, supra note 79, at 6.
101 See supra note 79 and accompanying text. In fact, this principle of sanctity of
contracts is an universally accepted principle. See Larry A. DiMatteo, An International
Contract Law Formula: The Informality of International Business Transactions Plus The
Internationalization of Contract Law Equals Unexpected Contractual Liability, 23
SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. 67 (1997).
102 Alberto L. Zuppi, A Comparison of Buyer's Remedies Under the CISG with the
Latin American Legal Tradition, in PACE REVIEW OF THE CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS
FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS (CISG) 1998, 3-39 (Kluwer Law International
1999), available at http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/zuppi.html, at 4.
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encourages parties to honor all provisions of the original bargain.
Although the rejection and avoidance schemes are often said to
create very different principles and remedies, they are also in some
ways essentially equivalent. The rejection scheme under the UCC
comes with a cure provision, which creates a stricter scheme and
reduces the possibility of strategic behavior. °3 Furthermore, the
requirement of seriousness of the nonconformity is reintroduced
by a number of words and phrases in the UCC such as "reasonable
grounds to believe,"' 4 or "substantial impairment of value."'0 5
These expressions bring the concept of "perfect tender" closer to
the CISG requirement of "fundamental breach." At last, it must
also be kept in mind that the buyer's right of rejection under
Section 2-601 UCC is always subject to the good faith proviso of
Section 1-203 UCC. 106 This proviso further attenuates the effect
of the perfect tender rule and its possibilities of strategic behavior.
Both the substantial performance rule and the perfect tender
rule create incentives for parties to chisel on the contract.'0 7 Under
the system of substantial performance, buyers are required to
accept goods that deviate immaterially from what was originally
contracted for, and they consequently bear the cost of
nonconformity, unless they recover the cost by a claim for
damages.0 8 Sellers then have incentives to chisel on the deal and
opt for an insubstantially nonconforming tender.0 9 Indeed, sellers
may think that they do not have to produce a perfectly conforming
product, because there is not a "fundamental breach," such as to
allow avoidance of the contract by the buyers.
Under the UCC perfect tender rule, buyers have incentives to
make bad faith rejections when the deal turns out to be less
103 See U.C.C. § 2-508 (2002).
104 Id. § 2-508(2). See ALBERT H. KRITZER, GUIDE TO PRACTICAL APPLICATIONS OF
THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS 202 (Kluwer
Law and Taxation 1989).
105 U.C.C. § 2-608 (2002) (the buyer may revoke acceptance when the
nonconformity "substantially impairs" its value to him).
106 Id. §§ 2-601, 1-304.
107 GILLETTE & WALT, supra note 7, at 189.
108 Id.
109 Id. The architect of the UCC's perfect tender provisions, Karl Lewellyn, stated
that rules limiting the buyer's right of rejection often give the seller extraordinary power
to enforce a sale in bad faith. Priest, supra note 22, at 969.
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profitable than expected because of a drop in market price for the
goods." ' Sellers too have incentives to behave opportunistically
under the UCC scheme, especially on the initial tender, since they
can always cure it."' Also, since buyers must accept the new
conforming tenders offered as a cure, 12 sellers may think that they
can submit another "close-to-perfect," but not perfect, tender.
Sellers can even cure after the date for performance has passed
and have a "further reasonable time to substitute a conforming
tender," if they are surprised by the rejection of a nonconforming
tender.' The question of what is a "further reasonable time" is a
vague notion that will depend upon the circumstances.' Sellers
may thus take advantage of this additional delay, and perhaps take
advantage of an eventual rise or drop in the market price of goods.
Nevertheless, three factors limit the extent of the chiseling
done by parties to both a UCC and CISG contract."1 5 First, sellers
can always cure the defective tender." 6 That option limits the
buyer's motivation to reject. Second, buyers and sellers have
strong incentives to maintain their reputation in commercial
markets."' Therefore, they hesitate before acting strategically and
acquiring a bad reputation among current or future business
partners. Third, vulnerability to a claim for damages is always a
consideration.
110 GILLETTE & WALT, supra note 7, at 199-200.
''' Id. at 200.
112 Id. at 201 (emphasis added).
113 Id. at 201-02.
114 Id.
115 Id. at 191.
116 U.C.C. § 2-508 (2002); CISG, supra note 1, art. 37. Article 37 CISG provides
that the seller has the right to cure any "deficiency" in the goods so long as the "date for
delivery" has not passed. CISG, supra note 1, art. 37. Article 34 extends the right to
cure to deficiencies in documents up to the date of delivery, "if the exercise of this right
does not cause the buyer unreasonable inconvenience or unreasonable expense." Id. art.
34. The right to cure even extends beyond the date for delivery if cure occurs "without
unreasonable delay and without causing the buyer unreasonable inconvenience or
uncertainty of reimbursement by the seller of expenses advanced by the buyer." Id. art.
48(1). The seller's cure of a defective tender, both under the CISG and under the UCC,
is only efficient when it is done at a cost less than the diminution in value of the goods
because of the defect. Priest, supra note 22, at 973. However, this difference in value is
difficult to determine, since both parties usually have different valuations of the goods.
117 GILLETTE & WALT, supra note 7, at 191.
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A perfect tender rule is considered by some to reduce the costs
associated with a defective tender more than a substantive
performance rule, thereby encouraging efficiency in results.118
Indeed, negotiations are facilitated when consequences of any
nonconformity are clearly indicated, such as under a perfect tender
rule. Since sellers know that even a slight variation may constitute
breach, they are encouraged to allocate explicitly the risk of
variations from the contract description.119 Once a breach has
occurred, the certainty of the result of any litigation encourages
the parties to settle their dispute through private bargaining and
reduces the opportunities for strategic behavior.12 ° It may further
be argued that avoiding a bad contract will prevent or reduce a loss
by enabling a favorable substitute transaction to be made or an
expenditure to be avoided. By encouraging avoidance for bad
faith contracts, the perfect tender rule would thus create efficient
results. Nevertheless, this argument is offset against the risk of
strategic rejection discussed above.
Moreover, one must not lose sight of the fact that according to
the theory of "efficient breach," there are circumstances where a
breach of contract is more efficient than performance. 21
Breaching is more efficient than performing "when the costs of
performing exceed the benefits to all parties." '122 This happens
when there is a contingency that arises that makes the resources
needed for performance more valuable in an alternative use.123
The perfect tender rule may encourage opportunistic behavior by
parties in some cases, but it also allows parties to breach
efficiently in some cases.124
118 Priest, supra note 22, at 963-68.
119 Id. at 968.
120 Id.
121 DiMatteo, supra note 87, at 441.
122 ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 238 (3d ed. 2000).
123 Id.
124 Id. For example, an efficient breach occurs when A values living in his house at
$90,000, and B values living in A's house at $110,000. Id. at 241. A promises to sell
the house to B for $100,000, thus creating a surplus of $20,000. Id. However, before
they complete the sale, C shows up and wants to buy the house. Id C values living in
the house at $126,000 and offers to pay $118,000 for it. Id. If A transfers the house to
C, the surplus is now of $36,000. Id. In that case, there is thus more efficiency in A
breaching his contract with B, in order to sell to C. Id at 242. The perfect tender rule
2003]
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
In conclusion, the "perfect tender rule" and the "fundamental
breach" rules are fair and efficient. Although fairness is a hard
standard to define, it arguably is met under both schemes, since
parties generally get fully compensated. 125  Furthermore, the
default rules under the two schemes are efficient ones, as they
allow parties to secure optimal commitment to performing, as well
as optimal reliance. Be it under the CISG "fundamental breach"
standard or under the UCC perfect tender rule, coupled with their
cure provisions, the results are symmetric and equivalent to a
"substantial performance" requirement. 126
II. GRANTING ADDITIONAL TIME TO DEFAULTING
PARTIES UNDER ARTICLES 47 AND 63 CISG
A. Primary Purpose and Functions ofArticles 47 and 63
CISG
1. Primary Purpose
If the other party's breach is not fundamental, the only way to
avoid the contract is through the Nachfrist procedure in Articles 47
and 63, where an aggrieved party may "fix an additional period of
time of reasonable length for performance" by the other side. 12 7
Nachfrist is not mandatory, and it provides identical obligations
allows for such a breach. However, the problem is that this happens necessarily in an
opportunistic manner. Therefore, the efficiency is, again, offset by the strategic
behavior.
125 The only time parties do not get fully compensated is when there is cure by
repair, as in Wilson v. Scampoli, 228 A.2d 848, 850 (D.C. 1967).
126 And in fact, the perfect tender nile's interpretation by state courts moves more
and more toward a right to reject for substantial nonconformity. The rule was criticized
and was in decline even before the enactment of the UCC. JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S.
SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 8-3(b) (4th ed. 1995).
127 Nachfrist can be translated literally as "prolonged deadline." Alison E.
Williams, Forecasting the Potential Impact of the Vienna Sales Convention on
International Sales Law in the United Kingdom, 2000-2001 Pace Review of the
Convention of Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, 9, 47, available at CISG
Database, Pace University School of Law. Generally, the Convention deals separately
with (a) Nachfrist obligations of the seller and buyer's remedies for breach of contract by
the seller and with (b) Nachfrist obligations of the buyer and seller's remedies for breach
of contract by the buyer. Maryellen DiPalma, Nachfrist under National Law, the CISG,
and the UNIDROIT and European Principles: A Comparison, 5 International Contract
Adviser 28 (1995), available at CISG Database, Pace University School of Law.
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for the buyer and the seller about adherence, notice, and
reasonable length of time. 2 18 In fact, Nachfrist is not truly a
remedy of its own, but rather, it is meant to fit into the CISG
concept of fundamental breach.129 Also, it is restricted to cases of
non-delivery, as per Article 49(1)(b). 13° It has a close counterpart




The primary purpose of granting additional time for
performance under Articles 47 and 63 is to protect the buyer who
is waiting for a delayed delivery, or the seller waiting for the buyer
to take delivery or pay the price. 132 At some point, either could
declare the contract avoided or repudiate the contract, claiming
that there was a fundamental breach. 133  Alternatively, if either is
unsure of whether the breach is "fundamental," they could declare
an additional period of time under Article 47 or Article 63 for
performance of the contract. 3 4  After the expiry of that period,
they could then affirmatively consider a fundamental breach to
128 See DiPalma, supra note 127, at 2; see also Ericson P. Kimbel, Nachfrist Notice
and Avoidance Under the CJSG, 18 J.L. & COM. 301-31 (1999); David G. Fagan, The
Remedial Provisions of the Vienna Convention on the International Sale of Goods 1980:
A Small Business Perspective, 2 J. SMALL & EMERGING Bus. L. 317 (1998).
129 See COMMENTARY ON DRAFT, supra note 68.
130 Article 49(1)(b) CISG provides: "In case of non-delivery, if the seller does not
deliver the goods" within the time fixed by the buyer under Article 47 CISG, the buyer
may declare the contract avoided. CISG, supra note 1, art. 49(1)(b) (emphasis added).
However, in UNCITRAL and at the Diplomatic Conference, proposals were made to
make possible the Nachfrist procedure to cases where the seller delivers non-conforming
goods. HONNOLD, supra note 81, at 314. UNCITRAL rejected these proposals on the
basis of the fact that the notice-avoidance procedure could be abused to convert a trivial
breach into a ground for avoidance. Id. at 314; see also Harry M. Flechtner, Transcript
of a Workshop on the Sales Convention: Leading CISG Scholars Discuss Contract
Formation, Validity, Excuse for Hardship, Avoidance, Nachfrist, Contract
Interpretation, Parol Evidence, Analogical Application, and Much More, 18 J. L. &
COM. 191-258 (1999).
131 U.C.C. § 2-609 (2002); see also Taylor, supra note 69, at 902-03 (explaining
that it is similar to demanding adequate assurances from the breaching party, but that
Nachfrist reduces the risks to an aggrieved party'in invoking self-help).
132 Peter A. Piliounis, The Remedies of Specific Performance, Price Reduction and
Additional Time (Nachfrist) Under the CISG: Are These Worthwhile Changes or
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have occurred and avoid the contract. 35
2. Advantages to the Buyer
The first advantage to the buyer is the certainty brought to the
transaction. "[The] Nachfrist notice provides a basis for avoidance
without proof that delay beyond the 'additional period' fixed in the
notice constitutes 'fundamental breach."" 36  Indeed, if the goods
are still in the hands of the seller and the buyer fixes an additional
period of time for delivery, the buyer gains the right to declare the
contract avoided if the seller fails to deliver within that period. 37
Consequently, the notion of "fundamental breach" becomes
irrelevant to the failure to deliver the goods, thereby relieving the
buyer of the difficulty of establishing the presence of such a
135 The buyer can avoid under Article 49(1)(b) CISG. CISG, supra note 1, art.
49(l)(b). The seller can avoid under Article 64(1)(a) CISG, which applies when the
buyer's obligation to take delivery or pay the price is not met. Id. art. 64(1)(a). For
example, a decision of an International Chamber of Commerce arbitration panel awarded
damages to an Austrian seller where a Bulgarian buyer had failed to perform its
obligation of opening a document of credit for payment within the additional period of
time fixed for such performance by the seller. MICHAEL J. BONELL, INTERNATIONAL
CASE LAW AND BIBLIOGRAPHY ON THE U.N. CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS FOR THE
INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS § D 1992-2 (2001). In so ruling, the court held that the
suspension of payment of'foreign debts ordered by the Bulgarian government did not
constitute force majeure that prevented the buyer from opening a documentary credit.
Id. Another example is an arbitral award that was also rendered by the ICC Court of
Arbitration, where, although the delay in opening a documentary credit was not by itself
considered to amount to fundamental breach, the Italian seller was nevertheless entitled
to avoid the contract. Id. § D 1992-32. In that award, the fact that the seller waited
several months before declaring the contract avoided was "equivalent to the fixing of an
'additional period of time' for performance pursuant to Article 63 CISG" with the
consequence that failure by the Finnish buyer to perform within that period of time
entitled the seller to avoid the contract under CISG Article 64(l)(b). Id.
136 HONNOLD, supra note 81, at 329.
137 CISG, supra note 1, art. 49(l)(b). For example, in Judgment of May 24, 1995
[OLG] [trial court for selected criminal matters and court of appeals], 20 U 76/94,
available at Pace CISG Database, a German court, applying the relevant provisions of
the CISG, held that an Egyptian buyer was entitled to avoid the contract where the
German seller failed to deliver goods within an eleven-day extension period fixed by the
buyer for performance of the remainder of an installment contract that the seller had only
partially performed. The court found that the additional eleven-day period was not an
unreasonable one in the context of the particular transaction. Id. Accordingly, the court
awarded the buyer the amount by which pre-payment exceeded the amount due for the
limited amount of goods actually delivered. Id.
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breach.'38 The setting of a Nachfrist notice also provides certainty
with regard to the buyer's interest in fulfillment of the contract. 39
In general, on the economic level, bringing certainty to the
transaction reduces costs associated with uncertainty, or risk. 14
Indeed, the Nachfrist period annihilates the possibility of a change
of circumstances such as to cause the defect to fall below the
threshold of "fundamental breach."
A second important advantage to the buyer is that the buyer
may regain a lost right of avoidance of the contract by fixing an
additional'period of time.141 In a case where there is a breach of an
obligation other than failure to deliver, the buyer's right to avoid
the contract depends solely on whether or not the breach of the
contract is "fundamental.' 42  If there is such a "fundamental
breach" of contract, the buyer may declare the contract avoided
under Article 49(1)(a), but the buyer must do so within a
reasonable period of time after the buyer knew or ought to have
known of the breach of contract. 43 If the buyer chooses not to
avoid the contract and does not give any notice during that period,
the buyer regains the right to avoid the contract by fixing an
additional period of time.144
3. Advantages to the Seller
When an additional period of time for performance is fixed,
the seller is granted an important benefit. Indeed, the buyer is
138 CISG, supra note 1, art. 49(l)(a), (b); SCHLECHTRIEM, supra note 69, at 394-95.
The mirror provision in the case where the buyer fails to pay the price or take delivery of
the goods within the period fixed originally is Article 64(1)(b) CISG. CISG, supra note
1, art. 64(1)(b). That Article provides that the seller is then entitled to avoid the contract
without the need for the existence of a fundamental breach of contract. Id.
139 ENDERLEIN & MASKOW, supra note 45, at 146.
140 Priest, supra note 22, at 966.
141 SCHLECHTRIEM, supra note 69, at 395.
142 This derives from a combined reading of Articles 47 and 49(1)(b) CISG, as the
latter Article refers only to avoidance in regards to the delivery obligation. See Piliounis,
supra note 132, at 10. The mirror provision on avoidance by the seller in case of breach
by the buyer of obligations other than payment of the price or taking delivery of the
goods, is Article 64(1)(a) CISG. CISG, supra note 1, art. 64(1)(a).
143 CISG, supra note 1, art. 49(2)(b)(i). The mirror provision on time limits on the
seller's right to avoid the contract is Article 64(2)(b)(1) CISG. Id. art. 64(2)(b)(1).
144 SCHLECHTRIEM, supra note 69, at 395.
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bound by that period and may not during that time "resort to any
remedy for breach of contract," or declare the contract avoided on
account of a fundamental breach, unless the seller gives notice that
it "will not perform within the period so fixed." '145 Indeed, as
Professor Honnold explains: "A party may not refuse performance
that he has invited."'46  The seller may thus fully rely on the
additional period fixed, knowing that he will not be subject to any
other recourse.
B. Fixing the Additional Period of Time
1. General Conditions
An additional period of time may only be fixed once the
original delivery date has passed.'47 There are no particular
requirements as to form, and only Article 27 requires the buyer to
use "means appropriate in the circumstances," in order to put
transmission risks on the seller.148 The CISG is silent as to
whether the notice can be presented orally, or whether it must
absolutely be presented in writing. Some authors believe that a
broad interpretation of Article 11 CISG leads to the conclusion
that the notice may be presented by any means. 149
2. Specific Contents
When the buyer or seller fixes the additional period, he or she
must stipulate performance by a particular date, and cannot merely
demand performance in itself.15° He or she must explicitly
demand performance on a fixed and final date, rather than use
precatory language,151 and he or she needs not threaten to refuse to
145 CISG, supra note 1, art. 47(2). The mirror provision for the seller is Article 63(2)
CISG.
146 HONNOLD, supra note 81, at 317.
147 CISG, supra note 1, art. 45(1)(a).
148 SCHLECHTRIEM, supra note 69, at 191.
149 See DiPalma, supra note 127, at 3 (citing VICTOR KNAPP, COMMENTARY ON THE
INTERNATIONAL SALES LAW 463 (C.M. Bianca & M.J. Bonell eds., Giuffre: Milan,
1987)).
150 SCHLECHTRIEM, supra note 69, at 395.
151 Duncan, supra note 68, at 6. Professor Honnold explains that "a communication
that invites performance without making clear that a final deadline has been set could
mislead the seller into an attempt at substantial performance." HONNOLD, supra note 81,
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accept performance. 15 2 As stated in the Secretariat Commentary to
the 1978 draft of the CISG:
[This] period may be fixed either by specifying the date by
which performance must be made (e.g. 30 September) or by
specifying a time period (e.g., within one month from today). A
general demand by the buyer that the seller perform or that he
perform 'promptly' or the like is not a 'fixing' of a period of
time .... 153
3. Period Must be Reasonable
The time for performance must be a period of "reasonable
length." Professor Honnold contends that faced with the CISG's
flexible language and the subjective determination of what
constitutes a "reasonable" period, "the choice is given to the
buyer-the innocent party who faces breach by the seller." '154 He
adds that the "reasonableness" of this period should be considered
in light of the basic policy in Articles 25, 49, and 64 that contracts
should not be avoided on insubstantial grounds. 15 5  The
circumstances to be taken into account in determining whether a
period of time is reasonable are, according to Professor Peter
Schlechtriem:
[The] length of the contractual delivery period (transactions with
short delivery dates justify a shorter additional period, long
delivery dates require a longer additional period); the buyer's
recognizable interest in rapid delivery, if the seller should have
been aware of that interest upon conclusion of the contract; the
nature of the seller's obligation (a longer period is reasonable for
delivery of complicated apparatus and machinery of the seller's
own manufacture than for delivery of fungible goods by a
wholesaler); the nature of the impediment to delivery (if the
seller is affected by a fire or strike, a buyer can be expected to
at 315. However, as Schlechtriem explains, a statement by the buyer, for example,
which is more of a permission to postpone performance of obligations than fixing a
period of additional time still binds him. SCHLECHTRIEM, supra note 69, at 396.
152 SCHLECHTRIEM, supra note 69, at 396.
153 COMMENTARY ON DRAFT, supra note 68.
154 HONNOLD, supra note 81, at 315.
155 Id.
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wait for a certain time if the delivery is not particularly
urgent).1 6
Professor Honnold believes that the most important
consideration is whether the buyer needs to have the goods
delivered without further delay.'57  Furthermore, Professor
Schlechtriem comments that where a party has fixed a period of
time that is too short and seeks to avoid the contract after the
unreasonably short length, that party may only do so if a
fundamental breach has occurred, as if that party is considered to
have breached the contract.1 58 However, if that party waits until
after a reasonable period of time has passed, then Professor
Schlechtriem explains that the party should have the right to avoid
the contract.1 59 At last, where a period of time has been fixed that
is longer than a reasonable time, the party fixing it is bound by
i.160it. 6
C. Binding Effect
Serving a notice granting additional time has two effects.
First, and as seen above, 161 when an aggrieved party fixes an
additional period of time, he or she may not resort to any remedy
for breach of contract until the additional period has passed, even
if nonperformance by the other party otherwise constitutes
fundamental breach. 62 However, he or she ceases to be bound
even before the expiration of the fixed additional period if notice
is received from the breaching party declaring that he or she will
not perform the obligation during that period. 63  The aggrieved
party who serves the notice of additional time is not only
precluded from avoiding the contract, but also from bringing an
156 SCHLECHTRIEM, supra note 69, at 396.
157 HONNOLD, supra note 81, at 315.
158 SCHLECHTRIEM, supra note 69, at 397.
159 Id.
160 Id.
161 See supra Section II.A.3.
162 CISG, supra note 1, art. 47(2), 63(2). See also SCHLECHTRIEM, supra note 69, at
399. Contra ENDERLEIN & MASKOW, supra note 45, at 183-84 ("If the seller delivers
within the Nachfrist and a lack of quality becomes apparent the buyer may well invoke
his rights under non-conforming delivery before the period set has expired.").
163 CISG, supra note 1, art. 47(2), 63(2).
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action for performance, claiming a reduction of price, or asking for
delivery of substitute goods.164 However, an aggrieved party may
claim damages for delay in performance.'65
Second, if the breaching party does not take advantage of its
right to perform once again prior to the expiration of the additional
period, the aggrieved party is entitled to declare the contract
avoided.166 Indeed, the Nachfrist procedure makes performance of
basic contractual obligations within the fixed period of time
provided for in the notice of the essence of the contract.'67 This
time, as we have seen above,'68 there is no requirement of showing
that the failure to perform during the additional time amounted to
a "fundamental breach." The uncertainty concerning the exact
amount of delay that would be considered serious enough to
justify avoiding the contract is thus eliminated.
Finally, it must be noted that the Nachfrist provision in the
CISG goes beyond the common law in one respect. At common
law, an extension of time granted by the buyer (or the seller),
when not supported by consideration, is only binding on him or
her to the extent that the seller (or buyer) has relied on the
extension.'69  Nachfrist somehow resembles the doctrines of
estoppel and waiver at common law. 7° Similarly, the buyer may
not resort to any of the remedies available to him or her during the
Nachfrist period and the effect is to suspend performance rather
than extinguish contractual rights.''
164 SCHLECHTRIEM, supra note 69, at 399; Anette Gartner, The Vienna Convention
on the International Sale of Goods Contains Some Well-Known Inconsistencies, but
There is Much in it Which is Worth Preserving and Which Better Accords with
Commercial Reality Than the Sale of Goods Act 1979, (2000) (dissertation, on file with
Pace University School of Law), available at CISG Database, Pace University School of
Law.
165 CISG, supra note 1, art. 47(2), 63(2); see SCHLECHTRIEM, supra note 69, at 399-
400, 487.
166 CISG, supra note 1, art. 49(1)(b), 64(l)(b).
167 HONNOLD, supra note 81, at 317.
168 See supra Section I.A.2.
169 Zuppi, supra note 102, at 1.
170 Williams, supra note 127, at 1.
171 Id. Williams notes that there are also differences between the estoppel and
waiver doctrines and the Nachfrist doctrine. Id. She explains that promissory estoppel
can be used "as a shield and not as a sword," but that in case of non-delivery at the end
of the Nachfrist period, the right of avoidance arises automatically and can be used as a
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D. Efficiency and Fairness of the Remedy--Evaluation and
Justifications
Several CISG commentators have recommended the inclusion
of the Nachfrist provision in the UCC scheme, because it is
"carefully structured to serve the underlying principles of
protecting each party's interests," and encourages communication
and preserving contracts, which increases the chances that
expectation interests are fulfilled.'72 Nachfrist empowers parties to
protect their interests by being more cooperative, rather than by
resorting to judicial remedies. Moreover, Nachfrist tremendously
increases clarity and certainty in contracts. Indeed, an aggrieved
party can protect his or her interests and expectations by notifying
the breaching party that he or she has additional time to conform
to the contract, and that failing to conform to the deadline will lead
to termination. Generally, as Celia Taylor explains, "by
encouraging future exchange, self-help furthers society's interest
that each economic unit shift its resources whenever this would be
efficient."' 73
Major advantages to self-help remedies,' 74 such as the
Nachfrist notice, are: they are quick and readily available; they
produce an immediate result that is certain; they reduce later
evidentiary problems (and therefore increase certainty); and they
further the constant desire of parties to control the situation and be
sword. Id.
172 Taylor, supra note 69, at 24-25. An example of the importance of
communicating within the Nachfrist system can be found in Judgment of Apr. 24, 1990
[AG] [District Court], 5 C 73/89, available at CISG Database, Pace University School of
Law. In that case, a German buyer and an Italian seller of fashion goods entered into a
contract that specified that the goods were "to be delivered July, August, September."
Id. The seller made the first delivery in September, but the buyer refused the goods
claiming that the quoted language required that one-third of the goods should have been
delivered in July, one-third in August, and one-third in September. Id. The court held
that the seller was entitled to be paid the full purchase price, even if the goods had been
delivered late, because the buyer had not established a fundamental breach by the seller
or offered the seller an additional reasonable period of time for performance. Id. If
Nachfrist was in fact included in the UCC, it would fall within the performance-based
category, as set out by Professor Farnsworth. Duncan, supra note 68, at 164.
173 Taylor, supra note 69, at 849.
174 Self-help means "private actions taken by those interested in the controversy to
prevent or resolve disputes without official assistance of a governmental official or
disinterested third party." Id. at 841.
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autonomous.175  They are also cheaper than judicial action."'
Furthermore, by keeping things private, parties end up being less
confrontational and more reasonable than they would have been in
a courtroom.'77  On a societal level, Nachfrist and self-help
remedies generally free judicial courts and thus judicial resources
for other uses, which, in itself, is conducive of efficiency and
greater social welfare.'78  Parties granted additional time for
performance under the CISG obviate judicial interpretation and
create efficiency by saving important costs, solving the problem
between them. Indeed, sellers, for example, have strong
incentives to resort to Nachfrist, since they will not have to
disburse any further costs in order to get paid. On a more
philosophical level, self-help remedies, by giving parties a
powerful option and a corresponding impression of freedom,
encourage individuals to enter into commercial relations. 79
More specifically, another indication of the efficiency of
Nachfrist as a remedy can be found when comparing it to both
Sections 2-609 and 2-508(2) UCC. Indeed, all three remedies
provide for a post-delivery performance, and all three serve two
important purposes of contract law: securing optimal commitment
to performing and securing optimal reliance. 8 ° Section 2-609
UCC provides that an aggrieved party may ask for adequate
assurances of due performance, suspend his own performance, and
treat the contract as broken if his reasonable grounds for insecurity
are not cleared up within a reasonable time.'8' That Section rests
on the recognition of the fact that "the essential purpose of a
contract between commercial men is actual performance ... [;]
they do not bargain merely for a promise ... and that a continuing
sense of reliance and security that the promised performance will
be forthcoming when due, is an important feature of the
175 Id. at 847.
176 Id.
177 Id. at 848.
178 Id. Although in many cases, self-help is only the first remedy, and a series of
judicial actions may follow. Id. at 851.
179 Id. at 848-49.
180 See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 122, at 189.
181 U.C.C. § 2-609 (2002).
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bargain."1 82 Section 2-508(2) UCC provides that the seller can
cure a non-conforming tender after the time set for delivery, under
certain specific conditions, seen above.'83 Both the latter provision
and the Nachfrist provision are remedies that secure the future
bargained-for commitment and allow parties to a contract to rely
upon the assurance of performance. Overall, greater efficiency is
thus obtained.
Not only is Nachfrist an efficient remedy, but it also seems to
be a fair one. Under the Nachfrist procedure, aggrieved parties
recover what they originally contracted for in a fair and equitable
manner. The buyer waiting for a delayed delivery gets a
conforming tender at the expiration of the extended time for
performance, and the seller waiting for the buyer to take delivery
or pay the price is satisfied. In conclusion, the Nachfrist
procedure fulfills both fundamental principles of commercial law:
fairness and efficiency.
III. REDUCTION OF PRICE UNDER ARTICLE 50 CISG
A. Its Origins and Uses
The legal principle of reduction of price can be traced back to
the actio quanti minoris of Roman law, through the Justinian
Compilations.'84 Under Roman law, a buyer, having discovered
after delivery certain hidden defects that would have led him to
pay a lesser price had he known of them, could bring an action for
reduction of price or for rescission of contract. 85
The CISG remedy of reduction of price provides the buyer
with the unilateral right to reduce the price of purchased goods if
they do not conform to the contract, to the amount that he or she
would have paid had he or she known of the nonconformity,
unless the seller cures the nonconformity.'86 Since the Convention
182 Id. § 2-609 cmt. 1.
183 See supra Part I.A.
184 A.M. Tufi6n, The Actio Quanti Minoris and Sales of Goods Between Mexico and
the U.S.: An Analysis of the Remedy of Reduction of the Price in the UN Sales
Convention, CISG Article 50 and Its Civil Law Antecedents, 2.1 (1998) (unpublished
thesis, Pace University), available at CISG Database, Pace University School of Law.
185 Eric E. Bergsten & Anthony J. Miller, The Remedy of Reduction of Price, 27
AM. J. COMP. L. 255-77 (1979).
186 Article 50(2) CISG states that if the seller has remedied any failure to perform in
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does not adhere to the civil law doctrine that a seller is only liable
for damages caused by defective goods when he is guilty of bad
faith, fraud, or fault,'87 the buyer can to his great advantage claim
damages or declare the price reduced without showing fault.'88
This was said to deprive the reduction of price remedy of a ratio
legis,'89 but as this article demonstrates, the remedy can still be
amply justified. '90
The very purpose of the remedy, used primarily as a
counterclaim or as a defense to an action by the seller for the
purchase price,' 9' is to allow the buyer to keep the non-conforming
goods and pay the price he or she would have paid had he or she
been aware of the defects in the goods.'92 The rationale for this is
that it would be unjust to require the buyer to pay the full price for
non-conforming goods.'93 Therefore, the price is reduced just as if
the subject-matter of the contract had been nonconforming from
the outset. 194  As Schlechtriem explains, this remedy is an
"adaptation of the contract, not an award of damages. ' 95
B. Conditions
First, reduction of price only applies if the goods do not
"conform with the contract," as understood under Articles 35 and
36.196 Under Article 35, the seller must deliver goods, which are
accordance with Article 37 CISG or Article 48 CISG, or if the buyer refused
performance under these articles, he cannot reduce the price. CISG, supra note 1, art.
50(2).
187 KRITZER, supra note 104, at 437; Tufi6n, supra note 184, at 2.
188 Bergsten & Miller, supra note 185, at 275-76.
189 Tufi6n, supra note 184, at 10. Tufi6n explains that the oediles set the actio
quanti minoris to avoid the harsh effects of the rule caveat emptor ("let the buyer
beware") that limited the actio empti (the ordinary remedy available to an aggrieved
buyer). Id. at 2.1
190 See infra Part III.E.
191 Piliounis, supra note 132, at 15; Tufi6n, supra note 184, at 10.
192 Tufi6n, supra note 184, at 10.
193 Zuppi, supra note 102, at 7.
194 SCHLECHTRIEM, supra note 69, at 438.
195 Id.
196 The delivery of the wrong quantity of goods is covered by Article 35(1) CISG,
but is also subject to Article 51(1) CISG, which takes priority over Article 50 CISG and
provides:
2003]
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. [Vol. 28
of the quantity, quality, or description required by the contract and
contained or packaged in the manner required by the contract.97
Since the seller's liability will usually only arise when the risk has
passed, nonconformity is assessed as of that time.'98 Furthermore,
the question of whether the defect is "fundamental" or not is
irrelevant, along with that of whether the seller is responsible for
the defect or not.'99
Some commentators have held that the expression "if the
goods do not conform to the contract" under Article 50 means that
the remedy is applicable only in situations where the goods fail to
meet the quality-and not the quantity-obligations of the
contract.2°° This proposition is based on the following arguments:
that Article 35(1) does not explicitly state that delivery of an
insufficient quantity is a "nonconformity" of the tender; that
according to Article 35(2), goods do not conform to the contract
unless they meet quality specifications; and that there is a
distinction between a "deficiency in the quantity of goods" and
(1) If the seller delivers only a part of the goods or if only a part of the goods
delivered is in conformity with the contract, Articles 46 and 50 CISG apply in
respect of the part which is missing or which does not conform; (2) The buyer
may declare the contract avoided in its entirety only if the failure to make
delivery completely or in conformity with the contract amounts to a
fundamental breach of the contract.
CISG, supra note 1, art. 50.
197 Id. art. 35(1). It must also be noted that there is no price reduction for defects in
title, since Article 50 CISG limits price reduction to goods that "do not conform with the
contract." In fact, Tufl6n, supra note 184, at 4.2.3, explains why third-party claims do
not fall within the ambit of Article 50 CISG. They must conform to an implied warranty
of fitness for a particular purpose and to an implied warranty of merchantability. CISG,
supra note 1, art. 35(2).
198 CISG, supra note 1, art. 50(2). Article 36 CISG provides that the seller is liable
if there are defects in the goods at the time when the risk passes. Id. art. 36. See also
SCHLECHTRIEM, supra note 69, at 439 (explaining in what case there could be reduction
of price even though the risk still has not passed).
199 Indeed, as seen above, supra in Part IIl.A, fault does not count in reduction of
price.
200 Harry M. Flechtner, More U.S. Decisions on the U.N. Sales Convention: Scope,
Parol Evidence, "Validity" and Reduction of Price Under Article 50, 14 J. L. & COM.
153, 170 (1995) (citing HONNOLD, supra note 81, 313.1). Honnold explains:
"[Q]uestions have been raised as to whether price-reduction under Article 50 applies to
other types of non-performance such as delay, delivery at the wrong place, defects in
documents and the like." HoNNOLD, supra note 81, 313.1
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"non-conforming goods" in Article 37.2°1
In my view, these arguments are not persuasive. First of all, it
would generally not make much sense to apply Article 50 CISG
only to quality defects. It is more logical to let a buyer who
receives fewer widgets than contracted for simply pay for the
amount received and later contract again for the balance.2"2
Second, consider the fact that Article 51 provides that the
remedies set forth in Articles 46 to 50 may be applied to the "part"
of the delivery that is missing or that fails to conform to the
contract.20 3 The buyer may thus require the seller to deliver
substitute goods under Article 46(2), avoid the contract with
respect to the defective units under Article 49(1)(a), accept the
defective tender and reduce the price of the goods under Article
50, or claim damages under Article 74.204 As a consequence, it is
obvious that reduction of price would still be available in case of a
tender of the wrong quantity of goods. Third, Article 50 is clearly
applicable in cases where "the seller fails to perform any of its
obligations," which includes those under Article 35(1).205
Generally, when one interprets all provisions under Section II,
entitled "Conformity of the Goods and Third Party Claims," it is
manifest that the intention was to have both defects in quantity and
in quality fall under the concept of "nonconformity."
Second, to claim a price reduction, the seller must have given a
valid and timely notice of the defect as pertaining to Articles 39
and 40, unless he has a valid excuse under Article 44 for his
failure. 20 6 The notice may be given by a simple declaration of the
201 Fletchner, supra note 200, at n.68.
202 This is, of course, assuming that there has been no offer to cure the defective
tender by the seller.
203 CISG, supra note 1, art. 51.
204 Id.
205 Id. art. 50 (emphasis added).
206 For an example of a case where the buyer was held to not be entitled to a
reduction of the purchase price under Art. 50 CISG, because she could not prove that she
notified the seller of the alleged nonconformity of the goods, see Judgment of Oct. 12,
2000 [LG] [District Court], 22 S 234/94, available at CISG Database, Pace University
School of Law.
The buyer loses the right to demand a reduction in price under Art. 50(1) CISG
if she does not give a proper notice specifying the lack of conformity of the
goods .... This corresponds to the general rule contained in Art. 39(1) CISG
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buyer; there is no need for the seller's agreement." 7 Indeed, the
right to reduction of price is characterized as one that the buyer
may exercise unilaterally.
Third, it is manifest that in a case where the seller has a right
to cure the defective tender under Articles 37 or 48, that right
prevails over the buyer's right to a price reduction.0 9 Professor
Schlechtriem explains this very clearly, using a few hypotheticals:
If the buyer immediately... claims a price reduction without
first giving the seller an opportunity to remedy the defect and if
the seller subsequently offers to remedy the defects within the
period set out in Articles 37 or 48(1) or, without objection by the
buyer, indicates a period within which he will remedy the defect
under Article 48(2) and (3), the buyer's claim for a price
reduction is ineffective. If the buyer rejects the seller's timely
offer to remedy the defect, he loses the right to claim price
reduction. On the other hand, if the seller wrongly disputes the
defect and wrongly rejects the notice of lack of conformity as
being out of time or declares that he is not able to cure the
defect, the buyer is entitled to a price reduction. If it is unclear
whether the seller is willing to remove the defect, the buyer can
fix an additional reasonable period for performance under
Article 47. Article 47(2) then prevents the buyer from claiming
a price reduction until the expiration of that period.21°
All these hypotheticals are consistent with a goal of preserving
contracts and awarding the seller a second chance at tendering
conforming goods.
Finally, it must be emphasized that it does not matter "whether
which stipulates that the buyer loses the right to rely on a lack of conformity of
the goods if she does not give notice to the seller specifying the nature of the
lack of conformity within a reasonable time after she has discovered it or ought
to have discovered it. While the [buyer] submits that her employee, witness G.,
had informed the [seller] of the defective material immediately after it had been
delivered in October of 1996, [buyer] has not offered sufficient proof to
convince the Court of the accuracy of her submission.
Id.
207 ENDERLE1N & MASKOW, supra note 45, at 163.
208 Tufi6n, supra note 184, at 4.2.1.
209 CISG, supra note 1, art. 50; SCHLECHTRIEM, supra note 69, at 440; Tufi6n, supra
note 184, at 12. This is consistent with the general philosophy of the CISG in preserving
contracts.
210 SCHLECHTRIEM, supra note 69, at 439.
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the price has already been paid. 211 A buyer may reduce the price
even though he or she has already paid.21 2 The buyer will then
simply ask the seller for a refund of a part of the purchase price.213
On the contrary, if the price has not been paid yet, the buyer will




Essentially, reduction of price is a proportional reduction of
the contract price, which must be proven by the buyer.215  The
reduced price must bear the same relationship to the price
originally agreed to as the value of the nonconforming goods
actually delivered bears to the value of conforming goods. 216 The
best and simplest way to calculate the price reduction is as
follows:
Stipulated price = Value of conforming goods
Reduced price Value of non-conforming goods
(price owed by the buyer)
or:
Reduced price = Value of the goods delivered x Contract price
Hypothetical value of conforming goods 2
17
211 CISG, supranote 1, art. 50.
212 COMMENTARY ON DRAFT, supra note 68.
213 Piliounis, supra note 132, at 15; SCHLECHTRIEM, supra note 69, at 443;
ENDERLEIN & MASKOW, supra note 45, at 159 ("[the buyer (who has already paid)] has a
right to be reimbursed in the amount of the reduction.").
214 Piliounis, supra note 132, at 15.
215 SCHLECHTRIEM, supra note 69, at 443.
216 Id. at 438. The author calls this calculation method the "proportional calculation
method." Id. Also, he explains that the buyer cannot take the estimated value of the
goods delivered nor simply deduct the cost of repair to determine the reduced price. Id.
217 Tufi6n, supra note 184, at 11; SCHLECHTRIEM, supra note 69, at 441. An
example of a case where this formula was used is Judgment of Apr. 3, 1990 [LG] [Trial
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Again, what these formulas demonstrate is that the goal of
reduction of price is to enable the buyer to preserve the bargain, be
it a good one or a bad one.218 Of course, proportions of quality
defects may be much harder to calculate than proportions of
quantity defects. z19 Indeed, a buyer who receives seventy cases of
wine instead of one hundred can easily declare that he will only
pay seventy percent of the original purchase price. However, if
the defect is for example an overly sour tinge in some wine bottles
and not others, then the proportion is much harder to establish.
Furthermore, it should be mentioned that in a case where the
goods are without value, the reduction of the contract price is
brought down to zero, or the contract is declared avoided.2 0 Since
reduction of price does not take into account the true loss suffered
by the buyer, the latter may claim damages under Article 45(1)(b)
and (2) on top of the price reduction.2 1 In fact, the buyer may
Court], 41 0 198/89, available at http://unilex.info/case.cfm?pid=l&do=case&id
=24&step+Abstract (last visited Jan. 25, 2003) (on file with the North Carolina Journal
of International Law and Commercial Regulation). In that case, the reduction of price
remedy was resorted to where a German buyer and an Italian seller entered a contract for
the sale of shoes, and where the buyer paid only half the purchase price, claiming that the
goods were nonconforming under the contract. Id. para. 1. The seller sued for the entire
purchase price. Id. The German court found that because the buyer had satisfied its
obligations to timely inspect the goods and notify the seller of the defects, it was entitled
to a reduction of price of the goods. Id. para. 3. However, the court explained that the
reduction of price needed to reflect the difference between the value of the goods as
delivered and the value the goods would have had if they had been in conformity with
the contract. Id. Thus, the court held that the seller was entitled to recover the difference
between the price reduction the buyer actually took and the reduction of price the buyer
was entitled to take. Id. For a similar case, see Judgment of Apr. 27, 1992, Pretore della
giurisdizione [District Court], 6252, available at http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/
cases/920427sl.html (last modified May 3, 2002).
Pursuant to well-settled case law, reduction of the price is performed in
accordance with the following formula: reduced price: convened price =
objective value of the non-conforming goods: value of conforming goods. The
objective value of the conforming goods is presumed to correspond to the
agreed upon price. The difference between the value of the conforming goods
and the value of the non-conforming goods does not necessarily coincide with
the cost to repair, but most of the time it does.
Id.
218 Tufi6n, supra note 184, at 11.
219 Piliounis, supra note 132, at 32-33.
220 SCHLECHTRIEM, supra note 69, at 443.
221 Piliounis, supra note 132, at 16; SCHLECHTRIEM, supra note 69, at 444.
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choose the method of calculation of reduction of price that is most
favorable to him: calculation under Articles 45(1)(b) and 74 or
under Article 50.222
2. Time and Place at Which Calculated
The relevant time to assess both the value of defective goods
and the hypothetical value of conforming goods is the time of
delivery.223 Indeed, Article 50 provides that: "[T]he buyer may
reduce the price in the same proportion as the value that the goods
actually delivered had at the time of the delivery bears to the value
that conforming goods would have had at that time[,]" making the
time of measurement clear.224
As for the relevant place where the market value of the goods
is calculated, the Convention leaves open where the value of the
conforming and/or non-conforming goods will be assessed.
Nevertheless, eminent commentators have explained that it must
be the place of destination of the transport organized by the seller
pursuant to Article 31(a) CISG or pursuant to the contract.225
Local circumstances are relevant to the value of the goods
delivered and to the hypothetical value of conforming goods, but
those of the place of dispatch should never be taken as an
alternative to those at the destination.226
D. Contrasts and Comparisons
1. Goal ofArticle 50 CISG vs. Goal of Awarding
Damages
Reduction of price saves the bargain between the parties and
prevents unfair enrichment of the seller.2 Awarding damages
222 SCHLECHTRIEM, supra note 69, at 444.
223 Id. at 441. Article 30 CISG indicates that the seller must deliver the goods and
hand over any documents and transfer property in the goods. CISG, supra note 1, art.
30.
224 Id. (emphasis added).
225 SCHLECHTRIEM, supra note 69, at 442; ENDERLEIN & MASKOW, supra note 45, at
307. For example, in the case of carriage of goods, it should be the place of destination
of the goods.
226 SCHLECHTRIEM, supra note 69, at 442.
227 Tufi6n, supra note 184, at 7.
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places the aggrieved party in the same position as he or she would
have been had it not been for the breach,228 thereby giving the
aggrieved party his or her expectation interest. The reduction of
price remedy is not designed to protect the expectation interest, the
reliance interest, or the restitution interest.229  As seen above,
Article 50 puts an aggrieved party in the position he or she would
have been in had he or she purchased the goods actually delivered
rather than the ones promised.23° Put differently, "expectation
damages are designed to preserve for an aggrieved party the
benefit of her bargain; reduction of price under Article 50 attempts
to preserve the proportion of her bargain. 23'
What flows from all this is that reduction of price will not be
subject to either the mitigation of damages or the foreseeability
requirements.23 2 Mitigation, notably, is required under Article 77
CISG in all cases of liability to pay damages for breach of
contract, 233 and thus not for reduction of price.234 But in fact, this
228 CRASWELL & SCHWARTZ, supra note 91, at 39. See Jeffrey S. Sutton, Measuring
Damages Under the United Nations Convention on the International Sale of Goods, 50
OHIO ST. L. J. 737-52 (1989), for measuring such damages under the CISG.
229 Fletchner, supra note 200, at 172.
230 See supra Section III.C. 1.
231 Fletchner, supra note 200, at 174.
232 GILLETTE & WALT, supra note 7, at 326. As Gillette and Walt explain, that is
also why an aggrieved buyer or seller can combine the reduction of price and a claim for
damages. Id. Nevertheless, commentators have adopted different views on the issue of
whether the obligation to mitigate losses refers only to the reduction of damages under
Article 77 of the CISG (which codifies the mitigation principle). For instance, Enderlein
and Maskow explain that an American proposal to extend the mitigation principle to
other remedies was rejected. ENDERLEIN & MASKOW, supra note 45, at 308.
Nevertheless, they also explain that it was suggested by other commentators to treat the
obligation to mitigate losses as a genuine obligation whose breach will entail the
obligation to compensate for damages. Id. at 309. They sustain that "[o]ne could also
imagine invoking Article 77 analogously on the basis of the principle of good faith." Id.
Thus, based on these views and theories, one could seek to give the mitigation principle
a broader reach than "damages" pursuant to Article 77, and put the concept into play in a
situation of reduction of price under Article 50 of the CISG. On the mitigation principle,
see Djakhongir Saidov, Methods of Limiting Damages Under the Vienna Convention on
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, (Dec. 2001),
http://www.cisg.law.pace/cisg/biblio/saidov.html (on file with the North Carolina
Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation).
233 SCHLECHTRIEM, supra note 69, at 584. The underlying principle to this provision
is that loss resulting from a breach of contract, including loss of profit, should not be
compensated to the extent that it could have been reduced by the taking of reasonable
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is contrary to the efficiency rationale, as costs/losses may end up
being much more important to the breaching party who may have
to pay high consequential damages under Article 45(1)(b) CISG
on top of agreeing to reduce the price. These costs could be
lessened or prevented if the aggrieved party takes appropriate
measures to minimize his or her losses.
2. Provisions of the UCC
There is no direct equivalent to Section 50 CISG in the
UCC.235 The closest counterpart is the remedy provided in Section
2-717 UCC, which allows the buyer to deduct all or part of his
damages from any breach of contract from any part of the price
still due.236 However, the remedy of reduction of price should be
separate from damages and should not be confused with the right
to set-off.237 In fact, that mistake was made during the
deliberations of the Draft Convention, where some common law
participants appeared to confuse the two remedies.238 Today, that
mistaken belief still haunts U.S. commentators on the
Convention.239
Furthermore, the reduction of price remedy under Article 50
CISG must be distinguished from the Section 2-508(2) UCC
measures. Id.
234 Unless of course one adopts the view that the right to price reduction will be lost
when the buyer refuses to have the defect cured by the seller, thus refusing to mitigate
his loss. ENDERLE1N & MASKOW, supra note 45, at 308.
235 KRITZER, supra note 104, at 375.
236 Id. Kritzer further mentions Section 2-613 UCC, which also authorizes price
adjustment. Id.
237 Bergsten & Miller, supra note 185, at 256; Visser, supra note 79, at 290,
explains:
[T]he right to set-off reflected in paragraph 2-717 of the UCC allows for the
reduction of the price by the buyer to compensate damages in general; Article
50 CISG only allows a proportional reduction of price for non-conforming
goods. Thus the basis of paragraph 2-717 and Article 50 CISG are substantially
different as the remedy provided for in Article 50 CISG is limited to only a
proportional reduction of price.
Visser, supra note 79, n.290
238 Bergsten & Miller, supra note 186, at 255; G~irtner, supra note 164, at 62;
Tufi6n, supra note 184, at 11.
239 Tufi6n, supra note 184, at 11.
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provision on cure of a non-conforming tender.24 ° That provision
contemplates that the buyer may accept a money allowance to cure
the non-conforming tender.24' However, the reduction of price is a
remedy for the buyer, and the right to cure under Section 2-508(2)
UCC is one for the seller.242 Also, as the author Tufi6n explains:
"The money allowance seems more like an indemnity of the
damages suffered by the buyer when taking non-conforming goods
rather than a reduction of the price to the amount the buyer would
have paid knowing the defects were present in the goods.' '243 In
both cases, the practical result is the same: the buyer ends up
paying for the value of the goods as delivered. In the case of
reduction of price, the original price is reduced so that the buyer
pays the price of the goods received, and similarly, in the case of
cure with a money allowance, the seller will often simply deduct
the money allowance from the price paid or to be paid by the
buyer.
E. Its Justifications
Authors have problems finding a justification for Article 50
CISG.244 In fact, omitting price reduction was considered in the
original deliberations; but in the end the remedy was preserved,
because of its widespread nature, especially in civil law countries,
and because it could benefit the buyer more in certain
circumstances.245 As seen above, the price reduction remedy
240 As seen above, Section 2-508(2) UCC gives the seller the right to cure a non-
conforming tender and provides that the buyer may accept a money allowance to cure a
non-conforming delivery. U.C.C. § 2-508(2) (2002).
241 Id. Section 2-508(2) UCC provides "with or without money allowance." Id
(emphasis added). Indeed, as seen above, cure presents the seller with four choices: (1)
to compensate the buyer for the goods' decrease in value if the buyer retains them; (2) to
repair the goods; (3) to replace the good; and (4) to let the deal go. SCHWARTZ & SCOTT,
supra note 14, at 288.
242 Tufi6n, supra note 184, at 5.
243 Id.
244 See John P. McMahon, Applying The CISG: Guides for Business Managers and
Counsel, Part I, in 1 GUIDE TO THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS CONVENTION, at
153.007 (William A. Hancock ed., Business Laws, Inc. 2000) (quoting Professor
Farnsworth for explaining the U.S. reaction to Article 50 in the following terms: "Price
Reduction-We don't understand it, and we don't like it."); GILLETE & WALT, supra
note 7, at 327.
245 SCHLECHTRIEM, supra note 69, at 439.
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yields results inconsistent with the protection of the expectation
interest of parties to a commercial bargain.246  Further, it brings
doubt as to whether it leads to fair results. 247  So what are its
possible justifications?
1. Case of Force Majeure
The reduction of price remedy is an important right
independent from the damages provisions in several instances.
The first and most important one is where the buyer accepts
defective goods under circumstances in which the seller is not
liable for damages. 248 For instance, there is such a case where the
seller can claim exemption under the force majeure exception for
failure to perform "due to an impediment beyond ... control"
under Article 79 CISG. 24 9  There is no problem if the seller's
failure amounts to a "fundamental breach" under Article 25 CISG,
as the buyer may then simply reject the goods and declare the
contract avoided. But where the buyer accepts the goods, the
seller is free from liability for force majeure under Article 79(1)
CISG and the buyer cannot claim damages. In that specific
instance, reduction of the price is the only possible remedy for the
246 Except where the market price stays the same, where damages and reduction of
price give the same recovery. In that case, the expectation interest of the parties is met.
See GILLETrE & WALT, supra note 7, at 199-200; supra Section III- D.1; infra Section
E. 2. An example clarifies this conclusion. Suppose that on June 1, the seller contracts
with the buyer, "Mama Pasta," to sell 100,000 cases of Grade 1 tomatoes for $25 a case,
delivery on July 1. On the delivery date, the seller delivers 100,000 cases of Grade 2
tomatoes, and the buyer, although disappointed, elects to accept the shipment (he will
make tomato paste instead of tomato sauce with the Grade 2 tomatoes). By July 1, the
market value of Grade 1 tomatoes is only $20 per case and the Grade 2 tomatoes actually
delivered are worth $15 a case. If Mama Pasta chooses to recover damages under Article
74 CISG, it will get the difference between the value that the tomatoes originally
contracted for would have had and the value of the tomatoes as actually delivered. It
will thus get $5 per case damages, and pay $20 a case, instead of the $25 a case as
originally contracted for. But if Mama Pasta chooses to reduce the price, it will pay only
$18.75 per case (15 x 25 = 375, and then 375/20 = 18.75 = reduced price, per case). The
latter result is thus far from an award of expectation damages, as calculated under Article
74 CISG. See Fletchner, supra note 200, at 171.
247 Since in some cases, it overcompensates the buyer, at the expense of the seller.
248 HONNOLD, supra note 81, at 312.
249 CISG, supra note 1, art. 79. That is, when the seller's failure to perform is due
to unexpected circumstances, the equivalent of act of god, or fait du prince. See
COMMENTARY ON DRAFT, supra note 68, at 2; Gdrtner, supra note 164, at 3-4.
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buyer."'
2. Case of Falling Market
According to Article 45(2) CISG, the buyer can resort to a
claim for damages in addition to declaring the reduction of price in
cases where damages would provide better monetary relief than a
reduction in the price.25 Under this remedy, the buyer would get
immediate relief from the reduction of price, while the rest of its
claim would be under negotiation or litigation. But in what cases
should a buyer resort to such measures?
The most important and frequent situation is where the market
price of the goods changes substantially between the time of
contracting and the time of delivery. In fact, where the market
price stays the same as the contract price, there is no difference in
the amount of damages and the amount of price reduction.2
When the market price rises, a buyer normally will claim damages
under Article 74 CISG, since this will protect his or her
expectation interest.253 When the market price falls, the buyer will
often reject the goods in order to obtain conforming replacement
250 See Bergsten & Miller, supra note 185, at 273; Gdrtner, supra note 164, at 65.
251 See COMMENTARY ON DRAFT, supra note 68, art. 41.
252 For example, if contract price is $100, the value of conforming goods is $100
and the value of non-conforming goods is $90. Damages that are recoverable under
Article 74 CISG are: $100 - $90 = $10. Under Article 50 CISG, the reduced price is in
the amount of $90/$100 x $100 = $90. The price is thus reduced by $10. See CISG,
supra note 1, art. 50, 74.
253 To fully illustrate this point, imagine that a seller contracts with a buyer, "Mama
Pasta," on September 1 to sell a $100,000 cargo of tomatoes, with delivery in three
months, on December 1. The seller dispatches the tomatoes that conform to the contract,
but during the trip, the ship is stuck at a nearby port for a month or so for truly
unexpected reasons. The result is that the cargo of tomatoes arrives at the destination
one month or so later than the due date, and the tomatoes are moldy and unusable for
their originally contracted for purposes. The tomatoes could still be used by "Mama
Pasta" to make tomato paste (instead of tomato sauce), but the price of the cargo of
tomatoes is now worth one-fifth of the contract price. The buyer, "Mama Pasta," elects
to keep the tomatoes, but all the trouble and expenses required to make tomato paste
instead of tomato sauce results in a loss of $10,000. The last important fact is that the
price of tomatoes has doubled between the time of dispatch and the time of arrival: the
original tomatoes would have sold for $200,000, and the bad ones (used for tomato
paste) would have sold for $40,000. If the buyer were to claim damages under Article 74
CISG, he would get an amount of $160,000 ($200,000 - $40,000), whereas if he were to
ask for a reduction of price, he would pay $20,000 as a result of a price reduction of
$80,000. See HONNOLD, supra note 81, at 335-38.
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goods on the open market at less than the contract price, and in
that case, the buyer would not be able to claim a price reduction.
But on the contrary, if he accepts the goods, price reduction could
sometimes favor him tremendously.254 At last, it should not be
forgotten that the buyer may very well resort to both the reduction
of price and a claim for damages. 5
3. Where the Buyer Has Difficulties in Proving Loss
One eminent commentator, Peter Schlechtriem, has explained
this specific justification in the following terms:
[P]rice reduction is important as an independent right.., where
the buyer has difficulty in proving his loss, e.g. because he did
not buy the goods for resale but for altruistic purposes (e.g., the
seller delivers defective corn and the buyer's intention had been
to distribute it free of charge in an area suffering from
famine).256
This justification is, of course, extremely narrow and will only
apply in very exceptional cases.
4. Reformation of the Original Contract Versus
Alternative Form of Monetary Relief
The reduction of price remedy for quality defects can also be
justified as a reformation of the original contract; the seller
shipping out non-conforming goods; and the buyer accepting the
offer to keep the goods and pay a lower price.25 7 This proposition
seems to be an efficient one, as it allows parties to reduce
254 See SCHLECHTRIEM, supra note 69, at 438; HONNOLD, supra note 81, at 338;
Gartner, supra note 164, at 4. For example, take the same fact-pattern as in note 246,
above, except that instead of rising, the market price drops by one-half. In that case, if
the buyer resorts to the reduction of price, he again pays $20,000, as a result of the
$80,000 reduction in price. But if the buyer claims damages under Article 74 CISG, he
gets the difference between the value of conforming goods at the low price (half of
$100,000, which is $50,000) and the value of goods actually received (half of $20,000,
which is $10,000). He would thus get an amount of $40,000 in damages, and $80,000 in
reduction of price. If the amount of consequential damages was higher than $10,000,
then claiming damages might be a good option. (But it isn't here, since that would
amount to $50,000, which is still a lesser amount than the reduction of price.) See
HONNOLD, supra note 81, at 335-38.
255 CISG, supra note 1, art. 45(1), (2).
256 SCHLECHTRIEM, supra note 69, at 439.
257 Fletchner, supra note 200, at 9; Bergsten & Miller, supra note 185, at 274.
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transaction costs that would be otherwise incurred, and it
maximizes their surplus. Furthermore, reduction of price can be
seen as an alternative form of monetary relief.258 However, in my
view, that would too closely resemble the right to set-off damages
discussed above,259 and therefore, any such justification should be
rejected.
5. Restitutionary Measure
As explained above,260 reduction of price seeks to both
preserve the bargain and prevent unjust enrichment of the seller.
Flowing from this, some authors have argued that the Article 50
remedy is really a restitutionary measure, non-contractual in
nature, and that it is aimed at eliminating the amount by which the
seller has been unjustly enriched by delivering nonconforming
goods.26 1  However, Gillette and Walt have rejected this
justification, explaining that the Article 50 calculation does not
satisfy a restitutionary aim.26 2 Indeed, as we have seen above,
when the market price falls, a buyer resorting to reduction of price
receives more than the seller's gain from the breach.263
6. Partial Avoidance of the Contract
According to authors Bergsten and Miller, who commented on
Article 46 of the Draft Convention (now Article 50 CISG), the
remedy is justified if seen as a partial avoidance of the contract.264
They explain that:
viewed this way [as partial avoidance of contract], the monetary
relief given under art. 46 can be compared not only with
damages, but also with the monetary relief given the buyer when
he declares the contract avoided ... where the buyer has made
an unfavorable contract, reduction of price gives the buyer more
than he would get from claiming damages and less than he
would get from declaring the entire contract avoided.
258 Bergsten & Miller, supra note 185, at 72-74.
259 See discussion supra Section lI.D.2.
260 See supra Section LI.A.
261 GILLETTE & WALT, supra note 7, at 328.
262 Id.
263 See supra note 240 and accompanying text.
264 Bergsten & Miller, supra note 185, at 275.
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There is a practical side to this justification. Where the buyer
has made a bad bargain, he is encouraged by the traditional
measure of damages to seek avoidance of the entire contract in
order to be able to purchase substitute goods at the lower
prevailing price. Courts tend to be suspicious of the buyer's
evaluation of the seriousness of the defect of the goods in such a
situation, and well they might. Reduction of price goes part way
towards meeting the buyer's desire to get out of the entire
contract. By doing so it may cause some buyers to keep goods
[sic] which they might otherwise reject, a policy greatly to be
favored when it is remembered that the rejected goods in a case
falling under the Draft Convention will be in a country other
than that of the seller. To this extent art. 46 reinforces the policy
which [sic] lies behind the rule in the Draft Convention that a
party can declare the contract avoided only if the breach is
fundamental.265
In my view, this explanation is logical and the justification of
Article 50 CISG is a good one. However, again, one must be
careful not to confuse damages and reduction of price, since the
two are truly distinguishable.266 Bergsten and Miller do not make
this distinction so clear.267 Nevertheless, I do agree with them that
reduction of price amounts to a partial avoidance: if the buyer
rejects part of the tender because it is non-conforming quality-
wise, then he is only obliged to pay for the part of the tender that
he keeps, and thus the price to pay is correspondingly reduced.
But what about cases where the defect is one of quantity? In that
case, it seems as though the justification would fail: a buyer cannot
avoid the non-conforming part of the tender that he has not
received yet.
At last, if avoidance is the rationale, why base the formula
under Article 50 CISG on value, rather than on a percentage of the
contract price? The answer is simply that such a formula would
not adequately address all hypothetical situations, especially those
where the value of goods changes after the conclusion of the
contract. Indeed, "the more complicated proportional method of
calculation [of the reduction of price]," where both the value of
265 Id.
266 See supra Section III.D. 1.
267 Bergsten & Miller, supra note 185, at 256.
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goods delivered and the hypothetical value of conforming goods
are taken into account, is notably "intended for use in cases in
which the market price of the goods has changed between the
conclusion of the contract and delivery. 268 Where the price of
goods at time of delivery is "[equal] to the real value of
conforming goods at the time of the conclusion of the contract...
the reduced price simply equals the estimated value of the
defective goods. 269 Only in that case can the reduced price be
equivalent to a percentage of the contract price. But even then, it
seems as though the notion of percentage fits cases of quantity
defects much better than those of quality defects.
7. Moral Justification
Finally, one last possible justification to reduction of price is to
argue that there is an interest other than economic here.2v" The
interest is the willingness to bind the buyer to his original promise,
but only in a proportionate manner.271  Proponents of this
justification say that the Article 50 remedy is concerned with "the
promise, the moral duty to keep it, and more specifically, with the
moral right of the buyer to have the promise kept," and not with
the actual efficiency of the promise.27 2 They also explain that the
philosophy of giving the buyer only what he or she paid for, or
allowing him or her to pay only to the extent of compliance with
the original tender, is based on the same principles and policy as
those underlying the specific performance remedy.27 3
In my view, this justification is illustrated to a small extent
every time a commercial party invokes reduction of price in view
of enforcing the original bargain. Nevertheless, this justification
may also be criticized, assuming that it is valid, by asserting that
the willingness to bind the original seller to the bargain yields to
inefficient performances and makes coerced performances less
valuable and even worthless. Indeed, if the seller knows that the
buyer will accept the goods but ask for a reduction of price, he
268 SCHLECHTRIEM, supra note 69, at 441.
269 Id.
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may tend to submit non-conforming tenders and stop all efforts to
perform efficiently.
Conclusion
This comment has analyzed the scheme of remedies under the
CISG and the UCC, and more particularly, the remedies of
reduction of price and of granting additional time for performance
(or "Nachfrist"), in light of fairness and efficiency considerations
or of other justifications. At the outset, I asked: do the two general
schemes of remedies comply with the two commercial law
objectives, fairness and efficiency?
I have argued that the "perfect tender rule" and the
"fundamental breach" rule are probably fair and efficient ones.
Although fairness is a hard standard to define, I have noted that
both schemes are fair ones, since parties to these contracts
generally get fully compensated and are subject to a fair allocation
of burden and losses. Furthermore, I have explained that the
default rules under the two schemes are efficient ones, since they
allow parties to secure optimal commitment to performing, as well
as optimal reliance by parties. This comment thus serves to
conclude that both schemes basically amount to one of
"substantial performance." Indeed, the CISG's "fundamental
breach" standard and the UCC's "perfect tender rule," coupled
with their cure provisions, both create an efficient, equivalent
system for the sale of goods.
This comment has further concluded that granting an
additional period of time or "Nachfrist," as a self-help remedy, has
a number of great advantages. Notably, it frees judicial courts and
judicial resources for other uses and promotes efficiency.
Moreover, Nachfrist tremendously increases clarity and certainty
in contracts by encouraging negotiation between contracting
parties. On a more philosophical level, by giving parties a
powerful option and a corresponding impression of freedom, it
encourages individuals to enter into commercial relations.
Further, this comment explained that not only is Nachfrist an
efficient remedy, but it also seems to be a fair one, allowing
parties to the transaction to receive the exact benefit of their
bargain.
Finally, this comment concluded that reduction of price is
analyzed differently than the Nachfrist period and any other
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remedy. In fact, it does not award the expectation interest that
parties thrive to obtain in common law damages. Instead, it places
the aggrieved party in the position he would have been in had he
purchased the goods actually delivered rather than the ones
promised. I have questioned whether there is any doubt as to
whether reduction of price always leads to fair results. In my
opinion, the real question is: what possible justifications can be
attributed to reduction of price? I have concluded that it retains its
primary justification by insulating the buyer from impediments
that would exempt the seller from liability for damages, such as in
a case of force majeure. A second important justification is where
the market price for the goods changes substantially between the
time of contracting and the time of delivery, a case where the
buyer obtains much more by claiming reduction of price than by
claiming damages. Finally, I have explained that there may be a
moral justification, where the Article 50 remedy is concerned,
with "the promise, the moral duty to keep it and more specifically
with the moral right of the buyer to have the promise kept. ' 274
274 Id.
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